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United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) increasingly engage with local
communities to support peace processes in war-torn countries. Yet, while existing
research tends to focus on the coercive and state-building functions of UN PKOs,
their concrete local activities with community leaders and populations remain,
empirically and theoretically, understudied. Thus, this study investigates how
peacekeepers’ community-based intergroup dialogue activities influence communal
violence. It argues that facilitating dialogue between different communal identity-
based groups locally can revive intergroup coordination and diminish negative biases
against other groups, thereby reducing the risk of communal conflict escalation. This
argument is tested using a novel data set of intergroup dialogue activities organized
by the UN PKO in Coˆte d’Ivoire across 107 departments from October 2011 to
May 2016. Bivariate probit and matching address the nonrandom assignment of
these interventions. The analyses provide robust evidence that the UN PKO miti-
gated communal violence by organizing intergroup dialogues.
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In countries emerging from war, state capacity is often weak. State-building efforts
can take decades to bear fruit. In contrast, local community leaders may retain high
levels of legitimacy (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe 2015) and local conflict resolution
mechanisms tend to appear remarkably resilient (De Juan 2017). This begs the
question: can international actors advance postwar peacebuilding by engaging with
local communities and their conflict resolution mechanisms?1
Contemporary UN peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) are often mandated to
engage in conflict management at the local level, as in Coˆte d’Ivoire, the Central
African Republic, or Sudan. Intergroup dialogues represent one of the most promi-
nent tools for doing so. They are organized by the civilian components in UN PKOs
and involve community leaders and ordinary citizens of different ethnic groups
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations [UN DPKO] 2012, 167-
73). Yet, despite the importance of changes in local norms and behavior for sustain-
able peacebuilding (Stedman 2002, 20) and the centrality of local conflict resolution
capacity for peaceful political development (e.g., Tajima 2013; Wig and Kromrey
2018), research has neglected these activities with community leaders and popula-
tions locally. Do UN peacekeepers’ local intergroup dialogues help reduce violence
after war?
This study suggests that UN PKOs’ local intergroup dialogue activities help
decrease communal violence. First, intergroup dialogue activities offer an opportu-
nity for community leaders of different groups to meet and discuss local conflict
issues, sometimes with the help of direct mediation by civilian peacekeepers. In so
doing, these activities facilitate intergroup information sharing and coordination on
intergroup agreements to maintain social order locally. Second, intergroup dialogue
activities may reduce negative feelings and biases toward “out-groups” by providing
opportunities for positive contact between members of different groups living in the
same locality and by promoting norms of peaceful intergroup relations. Overall,
intergroup dialogue may thus mitigate violent communal conflict.2
I test this observable implication with novel spatially and temporally disaggre-
gated data on intergroup dialogue activities organized by the UN PKO in Coˆte
d’Ivoire. The data set was created based on thousands of UN press releases published
between October 2011 and May 2016. In this period, the United Nations Peace-
keeping Operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) carried out 777 intergroup activities in
different towns and villages. Peacekeepers organized these activities in response to
or in anticipation of violent conflict. To address the nonrandom selection of the
locations and timing of intergroup dialogues, the research design uses matching and
bivariate probit models.
Postwar Coˆte d’Ivoire is an ideal case for studying how intergroup dialogues
affect communal violence. First, violence in Coˆte d’Ivoire is often motivated by
community-level cleavages and aided or abetted by civilians (Balcells 2017). There-
fore, a substantive proportion of the violence in this country is the type that can be
addressed by local-level intergroup dialogue. Second, disputes over resources, and
particularly over land, are an important root cause of communal violence in Coˆte
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d’Ivoire. Because similar resource conflicts are on the rise on the African continent
(Boone 2014; Straus 2012), findings may inform peacebuilding interventions in
other settings. Third, potentially confounding context factors do not change in Coˆte
d’Ivoire during the period of analysis, thereby reducing the risk of omitted variable
bias. That is, informal authorities assume the primary responsibility for resolving
local disputes. The state is largely inactive in postwar reconciliation processes
(Pritchard 2016, 269), and the UN PKO is the main international actor engaged in
local peacebuilding (International Crisis Group 2014, 17). Fourth, interventions
organized by UN peacekeepers exhibit the necessary temporal and spatial variation
over the period of analysis.
The article makes three contributions to the peacekeeping literature. First, it fills
an important research gap and contributes to our explanations for why peacekeeping
works. Existing studies propose that peacekeeping is effective because peacekeepers
can monitor belligerents, use coercion to punish their violent behavior (Hultman,
Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014), rebuild failed state institutions (Doyle and
Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008, 98-102), and facilitate communication between belli-
gerents locally (Fortna 2008, 96-98; Wall and Druckman 2003; Ruggeri, Dorussen,
and Gizelis 2017). This study theoretically draws on the proposed mechanism of
facilitating communication locally and adds to it in three ways: it shifts the focus
from armed groups and political elites to community leaders and local populations as
interlocutors of peacekeepers. It emphasizes how peacekeepers can strengthen
locally rooted conflict resolution mechanisms. It evaluates preventive dialogue
activities at the local level, whereas prior studies tend to explore peacekeepers’
reactive efforts in facilitating communication in response to violent accidents. A
second contribution is that this article adds nuance to accounts of peacekeeping
failure. Several case studies have recently emphasized peacekeepers’ inability to
engage locally, their overt concern with the national realm and elections, and their
neglect of local-level conflict resolution (e.g., Autesserre 2009). Examining peace-
keepers’ engagement in local conflict resolution processes provides a different
perspective. Third, the article provides a novel monthly data set on intergroup
dialogue activities in Coˆte d’Ivoire. Analyzing these local-level data produces initial
systematic insights into subnational and temporal variation in a prominent civilian
activity of UN PKOs and directly tests one local-level peacekeeping pathway. The
results yield actionable implications for how peacekeepers’ local interventions may
complement their traditional deterrence functions.
Peacekeeping and Local Conflict Resolution
Recent conflict studies emphasize the importance of local mechanisms and institu-
tions for peaceful relations in society. Yet, research on peacekeeping remains sur-
prisingly silent on the topic. Drawing on the small but growing body of literature on
local peacekeeping interventions and studies of social engineering in postwar soci-
eties, the present article highlights UN PKOs’ ability to revive local conflict
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resolution capacity and thus complements existing explanations of peacekeeping
effectiveness.
A recent trend in conflict studies has been to explore the local capacity for
resolving conflict and maintaining order. Where state institutions are absent (Herbst
2000) or collapse during civil war (Tajima 2013), informal community-based insti-
tutions fill the governance vacuum and often play a major role in local conflict
resolution processes (De Juan 2017; Baldwin 2014). Community-based institutions
help deter and punish individual violations of the social order (Wig and Kromrey
2018). Informal punishment mechanisms alleviate the need for self-defense and
prevent the escalation of conflicts into communal violence (Fearon and Laitin
1996). Crucially, the findings suggest that strengthening conflict resolution capacity
likely contributes to keeping local peace.
Yet, how peacekeepers engage with these locally rooted conflict resolution
mechanisms remains theoretically and empirically under-researched. Most explana-
tions for peacekeeping effectiveness center on peacekeepers’ impact on armed
groups, political elites, and state structures. First, scholars propose that UN military
and police deployments impose physical and reputational costs for coercive acts and
thereby reduce violence both subnationally (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019) and
across countries (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014). Conversely, peace-
keeping deployment also heightens the rewards of peaceful behavior through inter-
national legitimacy, aid, and direct economic benefits (Fortna 2008, 89-93). Second,
peacekeeping operations rebuild or replace state capacity and reduce political
abuse—for example, by supporting reconstruction efforts, unifying the army, or
holding elections—thereby decreasing political incentives to renew violence (Doyle
and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008, 98-101). Third, peacekeepers can monitor belli-
gerents’ behavior and call out violent perpetrators, consequently reducing fear and
uncertainty about violations that could otherwise renew violence (Fortna 2008, 93-
96). Fourth, peacekeepers can prevent and control local accidents and involuntary
defections by facilitating communication between belligerents, providing on-the-
spot mediation and arbitration, and investigating incidents of noncompliance (Fortna
2008, 96-98; cf. also Wall and Druckman 2003). Adding to this latter mechanism,
this study investigates how peacekeepers ease communication between community
leaders and local populations of different ethnic groups and engage preventively to
strengthen locally rooted conflict resolution mechanisms.
While the policy-oriented literature has started to describe the benefits and
challenges of UN peacekeepers’ initiatives to strengthen local conflict resolution
(Bernstein and Kugel 2017), only a few academic studies have investigated these
interventions. Menkhaus (1996, 52-54) analyzes the UN Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM) and proposes that mediation support for customary leaders (clan
elders) and assistance in implementing locally rooted mechanisms for managing
interclan disputes contributed to reducing local violence despite the many flaws in
such international efforts and the failure of the national-level peace process. Mvu-
kiyehe and Samii (2017) explore the efforts of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
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to educate voters and establish an electoral violence early warning system together
with local communities. These community-based interventions led to more enthu-
siasm for elections and greater sensitivity to voter intimidation. In line with this
research agenda, the present article puts peacekeepers’ efforts around local con-
flict resolution at the center of the analysis.
Several studies problematize the interaction between international peacekeepers
and local leaders and populations. For instance, peacekeepers’ state-building activ-
ities redistribute political power locally. As a consequence, the losing side of redis-
tributional policies may show a hostile reaction toward peacekeepers’ activities
(Paris and Sisk 2008; Dorussen and Gizelis 2013). Another prominent argument is
that peacekeepers are ignorant of local knowledge—that is, knowledge of local
history, culture, authority structures, language, local modes of conflict resolution,
and so forth. Consequently, peacekeeping interventions are frequently inefficient,
ineffective, and counterproductive (Autesserre, 2014) and even undermine local
mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlement (Pouligny 2000, 31, 416 ff.). These
arguments on peacekeepers’ local knowledge deficit help explain peacekeeping
failures. Yet, they do not account for temporal and within-country variation in local
peacekeeping success.
Intergroup dialogues convened by UN PKOs are essentially social engineering
interventions aimed at influencing groups of people to change their behavior. A
growing number of studies find that social engineering has peace-inducing effects.
A randomized control trial in postwar Liberia shows that alternative dispute reso-
lution trainings in local communities organized by civil society and the UN helped
resolve individual land conflicts (Blattman, Hartman, and Blair 2014) and decreased
violence in the three years after the intervention (Hartman, Blair, and Blattman
2018). In postwar Sri Lanka, peace workshops and education interventions for youth
leaders of different ethnic groups contributed to an increase in interethnic behavioral
empathy (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005; see also Salomon 2004). Mass education
interventions appear to change not only individuals’ attitudes but also collective
behavior. For instance, Collier and Vicente (2014) show that a voter education
campaign in Nigeria decreased incidents of violence. Given these optimistic results,
it is timely to investigate social engineering on the part of UN peacekeepers to
promote local conflict resolution.
The Case of Coˆte d’Ivoire
The argument on the relationship between UN PKOs’ intergroup dialogue activities
and communal violence is evaluated in Coˆte d’Ivoire, a West African country of
approximately twenty-three million people. In the 1970s, a drop in worldwide agri-
cultural export prices, increasingly scarce land resources, and unclear land owner-
ship rights led to conflicts between indigenous western groups or “autochtones,”
nonindigenous Ivorian migrants or “allochtones,” and West African migrants or
“alloge`nes” (Babo 2013).3 In the early 1990s, the introduction of multiparty politics
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provoked the ethnicization of these land conflicts and their violent escalation (Bah
2010). Ethnic tensions fueled the first Ivorian civil war between 2002 and 2004
(Langer 2005). In 2004, the peacekeeping operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was
deployed. Despite its presence, contested elections in 2010 led to large-scale post-
election violence and renewed fighting.
Socioeconomic pressures, the experience of large-scale violence, and xenophobic
politics have diminished the capacity of customary authorities to independently act
as mediators and weakened norms of interethnic tolerance that have historically
supported peaceful conflict resolution through local customary mechanisms (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2014, i). In the western part of Coˆte d’Ivoire, which was most
severely affected by violence, “prominent local figures are distrustful and down-
hearted. Some customary, security and economic leaders hold entrenched political
positions and are not open to compromise” (International Crisis Group 2014, 13).
Yet, as state institutions remain weak, people in Coˆte d’Ivoire nonetheless rely on
customary dispute resolution mechanisms to prevent the violent escalation of private
or communal conflicts (Babo 2018; Pritchard 2016, 269). With the goal to strengthen
the capacity of locally rooted conflict resolution, UNOCI, sometimes in partnership
with the government, local civil society organizations, and other international actors,
regularly convened intergroup dialogues targeting community leaders and people of
different ethnic groups locally.
Coˆte d’Ivoire is an ideal case for assessing the impact of these intergroup dialo-
gue activities. First, violence in Coˆte d’Ivoire is overwhelmingly localized and
“direct” (Balcells 2017, 165), which means that it is perpetrated with small arms
and light weapons (rather than heavy weapons) and its organization depends on local
information and cooperation (Balcells 2011, 399-400). This violence, which is aided
or at least abetted by civilians, is the type of violence that can be addressed by the
local intergroup dialogue activities of UN PKOs. Second, studying peacekeeping in
Coˆte d’Ivoire informs conflict resolution in other African countries because the
character and root causes of communal violence are not specific to Coˆte d’Ivoire.
Violent conflict over land and other resources is on the rise on the continent (Straus
2012). Third, statistical analysis can isolate the effect of peacekeeping intervention
locally because the domestic context has not changed during the period of analysis.
Local disputes are usually first addressed by village leaders and other local author-
ities: chiefs, notables, land chiefs, and members of traditional village land commit-
tees. The governmental Commission for Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation and its
successor organizations have remained largely inactive in local conflict resolution,
and state-sponsored land reforms, including the establishment of land management
committees, have had little impact on the prevalence of customary conflict resolu-
tion procedures (Pritchard 2016, 269). UNOCI stands out as the most significant
outside actor involved in local conflict resolution (International Crisis Group 2014,
17). Finally, UNOCI organizes intergroup dialogues in different parts of the country
and at different times. This variation is exploited in the empirical analysis.
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Theory: UN Peacekeeping, Intergroup Dialogue,
and Local Peace
The argument explaining why UN PKOs’ intergroup dialogue activities reduce
communal violence builds on both rationalist and social–psychological accounts
of violent conflict. Both accounts suggest that a lack of intergroup exchange
increases the risk of intergroup violence. To link the lack of intergroup exchange
to violence, rationalists highlight information and coordination problems, while
social–psychological accounts emphasize biases and negative emotions regarding
other groups. By promoting intergroup exchange, UN PKOs’ dialogue activities may
help groups overcome these obstacles and revive locally rooted conflict resolution.
The Lack of Intergroup Exchange and Communal Violence
Rationalist explanations of violent conflict start from the premise that the expecta-
tion or experience of opportunistic violations—for instance, the illegal occupation of
a piece of land—can lead individuals to take violent action to protect themselves if
state authority is too weak to enforce order (Fearon 1995). In divided societies,
individuals’ opportunistic violations sometimes escalate into intergroup violence
because ethnic or other identity-based group divisions limit exchange and give rise
to violence-inducing information problems among groups. Without intergroup
exchange, it becomes difficult for the victim of a violation to obtain reliable infor-
mation on the perpetrator’s identity, other than that he or she is a member of another
ethnic group. Such information and coordination problems between groups can
trigger collective punishment against the other group (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Yet,
communal violence is not omnipresent in divided and weak states. Local commu-
nities have often established procedures of intergroup exchange to solve information
and coordination problems. Hereby, community leaders assume the role of
“professional mediators”. Through exchange with their counterparts in other groups,
they can obtain the necessary information on violations of intergroup order and
design adequate solutions—for example, compensation and punishment packages
(Fearon and Laitin 1996, 279 ff; Babo 2018 for evidence from Coˆte d’Ivoire). Yet,
the experience of war and divisive national politics, especially government bias
toward specific ethnic groups, can disrupt this intergroup interaction between com-
munity leaders and make it difficult to organize intergroup dialogue to identify and
punish perpetrators and compensate victims of intergroup order violations (Interna-
tional Crisis Group 2014; Brosche´ 2014 on government bias). In some places in Coˆte
d’Ivoire, for example, the experience of war has severely reduced the number of
people willing to take on a mediation role; customary leaders and prominent civil
society figures have come to hold entrenched political positions or have become
distrustful and downhearted (International Crisis Group 2014, 13-14). In sum, a lack
of intergroup exchange and the resulting information and coordination problems
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among community leaders interrupt locally rooted conflict procedures and make
violent conflict escalation more likely.
Beyond the information and coordination problems emphasized in rationalist
accounts, social–psychological explanations of violent intergroup conflict empha-
size how negative biases and emotions—especially if manipulated and mobilized by
politicians—can trigger violent attacks against members of the “out-group” (Fearon
and Laitin 2000). In Coˆte d’Ivoire, for instance, communal conflict during election
periods is often fueled by fears of local land grabs perpetrated by other ethnic
groups—threat perceptions and negative emotions that are deliberately exacerbated
by politicians to increase election turnout among their own constituency (Klaus and
Mitchell 2015). The experience of war and a resulting lack of intergroup exchange
can solidify biases and stereotypes (Hewstone and Greenland 2000, 140) and exacer-
bate negative emotions, such as fear and resentment, and the perceived threats posed
by the “out-group” (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). If people lack possibilities for
positive intergroup exchange, they have no means to verify the credibility of poli-
ticians’ claims about dangers posed by other groups and overcome their biases and
negative feelings. Therefore, people may be more inclined to engage in or support
violent attacks against other groups locally.
Linking Intergroup Dialogue to Peaceful Intergroup Relations
Building on these accounts, I argue that UN PKOs can help prevent violent com-
munal conflicts by facilitating intergroup exchange in war-torn societies. While the
pathways through which intergroup dialogue events reduce local violence may not
be exhaustive of all possible mechanisms and overlap in practice, it is helpful to
analytically distinguish two plausible pathways: (1) solving information and coor-
dination problems and (2) reducing negative feelings and biases.
First, intergroup dialogue activities may help overcome information and coordi-
nation problems among community leaders of different ethnic groups, thereby
strengthening locally rooted modes of peaceful conflict resolution. Existing research
highlights that UN peacekeepers can ease communication, alleviate uncertainty, and
build trust between belligerents because of their function as impartial third-party
arbiters (Fortna 2008, 93-98). As civilian peacekeepers are not entangled in every-
day local politics, they can initiate inclusive intergroup dialogues in cases where
war-related atrocities and divisive politics have made community leaders distrustful
and reluctant to meet (Nomikos 2018). Furthermore, intergroup dialogues are some-
times jointly organized by local civil society groups and civilian components of UN
PKOs. That is, civilian peacekeepers strengthen or help realize local initiatives for
dialogue by providing logistical, organizational, and financial support—for exam-
ple, transportation for participants, meals for the event, or administrative assistance
(e.g., Menkhaus 1996, for a similar argument). Finally, civilian peacekeepers some-
times directly mediate between community leaders during intergroup dialogue
events. Professional mediation helps community leaders identify solutions to
Smidt 351
lingering intergroup conflicts (e.g., Wall and Druckman 2003, 695). For example, in
the village of Kountiguisso in April 2016, UNOCI’s Civil Affairs officers made
suggestions to the village chiefs for settling a dispute over the allegedly illegal
acquisition of land. The intergroup dialogue ended with the signing of a document
that stipulated mutual concessions (UNOCI News 2016). Overall, facilitation
through impartiality, organizational support, and mediation provided by UN PKOs
may help community leaders to overcome information and coordination problems.
Thus, intergroup dialogues have an added value for restoring locally rooted conflict
resolution capacity.
Second, intergroup dialogue activities may also reduce stereotypes and negative
feelings regarding other groups and consequently generate support for local nonvio-
lent conflict resolution. That is, UN PKOs’ dialogue activities create the right condi-
tions for making intergroup contact between ordinary citizens and community leaders
from different groups beneficial to intergroup peacebuilding. Participants in dialogues
are afforded equal status as rightful citizens in a particular locality or as leaders in their
respective communities; work toward the common goal of local peace; are required to
cooperate to attain this goal; enjoy the support of other customary authorities and local
governments, which are also invited to intergroup dialogue events; and are offered
opportunities for friendship through common activities such as meals, theatre, and
sports matches (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). These favorable conditions enable
community leaders and members to correct mistaken views about the other groups,
form emotional ties, reconsider their group’s superiority, and refute alleged threats
posed by other groups (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005; Salomon 2004; Pettigrew 1998).
Moreover, civilian peacekeepers promote values of reconciliation, emphasize the
importance of these values for local development and peacebuilding, and highlight
the authority of community leaders and the legitimacy of local conflict resolution
mechanisms. These messages may alter the perceived utility of vigilante justice and
the violent contestation of wrongdoings (Blair, Blattman, and Hartman 2014). As
positive intergroup contact and the promotion of norms of peaceful intergroup rela-
tions reduce biases and negative emotions, community members should become less
likely to engage in or encourage communal violence.
While additional mechanisms may explain the effectiveness of intergroup dialo-
gues in upholding local peace, solving information and coordination problems and
reducing biases and negative feelings are two intuitively plausible pathways. Yet, as
discussed in the next two sections, the positive effects of intergroup dialogues are
limited to communal forms of violence, and they could be offset by unintended
negative consequences of international intervention in local contexts, especially the
drowning out of legitimate peacebuilding actors.
Intergroup Dialogue and Different Types of Violence
Intergroup dialogues are expected to influence violence that is aided and abetted by
local community members and related to a communal incompatibility. This is
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because intergroup dialogues target local community members—local elites and
ordinary citizens—rather than violence specialists, and intergroup dialogues aim
to address communal incompatibilities—for example, conflict between self-
identified indigenous people and migrant groups over land access. As such, inter-
group dialogues should first and foremost prevent communal violence perpetrated
by groups of local community members, such as clashes between youths from
different ethnic groups. Yet, the effect of intergroup dialogue activities may not
be limited to communal violence by groups of civilians. Instead, intergroup dialo-
gues may also influence violence that is related to a communal incompatibility but
perpetrated by nonstate armed actors. We know that local civilians often act as
suppliers of information, material resources, and recruits for armed groups (Kalyvas
2003, for the general argument; Balcells 2017, for evidence from Coˆte d’Ivoire). For
example, intelligence from community members helped pro-opposition militias in
Coˆte d’Ivoire identify the houses of alleged pro-government supporters (Interna-
tional Crisis Group 2014, 20-21; United Nations Security Council 2012, para. 2).
Furthermore, extant research also shows that civilians influence armed group vio-
lence not only by refusing collaboration but also through active resistance, for
example, by convincing armed groups to not enter a village or by occupying stra-
tegic positions to block armed attacks on other groups (Krause 2017, 278-79). By
facilitating peaceful solutions to communal conflicts, intergroup dialogue activities
may discourage community members from lending support to armed groups for
addressing communal incompatibilities and encourage resistance.
Not every coercive act on the part of an armed group is carried out jointly with
community members and related to a communal incompatibility. For violence that
does not fulfill these two criteria, intergroup dialogues should make little difference.
Whether a violent event has been organized with local civilian support and relates to
a communal incompatibility is hard to observe. Yet, there are some plausible types
of violence that likely do not fulfill these criteria: criminal violence by armed
groups, violent attacks by foreign armed groups with an ideological agenda, and
violent acts by security forces against opposition mobilization are, at least partially,
motivated by profit, ideology, and national politics, respectively. As intergroup
dialogues, however, aim at solving communal incompatibilities, violence of these
kinds should be less affected by these interventions. Thus, the analyses focus on
communal violence by groups of civilians and armed groups.
Why Local Peacekeeping May Fail to Mitigate Communal Violence
The effectiveness of intergroup dialogues depends on peacekeepers’ ability to mean-
ingfully engage with and persuade local community leaders and citizens. This ability
is debated. First, external sponsorship of local peacebuilding bears the danger of
drowning out bottom-up peacebuilding efforts. International support for some com-
munity leaders—potentially those who speak a European language and share liberal
peacebuilding goals—may discourage more legitimate actors from engaging in local
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conflict resolution (Pouligny 2005, 499). Second, UN peacekeepers may lack the
knowledge and intercultural understanding to effectively engage with local authority
structures (Autesserre 2009, 2014). In the worst case, they may introduce new norms
of conflict resolution that undermine functioning dispute resolution mechanisms
(Pouligny 2000).
Nevertheless, I expect that intergroup dialogues organized by UN PKOs can
overcome these challenges. First, civilian peacekeepers do not have to convince
community members of fundamental change. Instead, intergroup dialogues build
on well-established norms and conflict resolution mechanisms that are already
deeply rooted in local communities. Second, the Civil Affairs unit of the UN delib-
erately warns against the drowning-out effects of UN PKOs’ local activities and
proposes mechanisms for civilian personnel to address this challenge—that is, prior
careful analysis of the local context (UN DPKO 2012, 181-82). Thus, it is plausible
to expect that intergroup dialogues convened by UN PKOs help mitigate communal
violence.
Hypothesis 1: The average probability of communal violence is lower in
localities where UN peacekeepers organize intergroup dialogue activities than
in localities where UN PKOs do not organize intergroup dialogue activities.
Research Design
The analyses use monthly information on UN peacekeepers’ intergroup dialogue
activities across 107 departments (third-tier administrative units) in Coˆte d’Ivoire
between October 2011 and May 2016.4 The time period has been chosen for three
reasons. First, large-scale violence and fighting after the 2010 elections may have
prevented the organization of intergroup dialogues in the most violent localities.
Second, intergroup dialogue became more regular after the postelectoral crisis, with
similar numbers of events in the years 2012 to 2016. Third, source data for UNOCI’s
activities were only available until May 2016.
To capture local intergroup activities, I rely on 8,302 French and English press
releases published on the UNOCI News web page between January 2006 and May
2016 (UNOCI News 2017).5 Naive Bayesian classification (with multinomial dis-
tribution and a uniform prior) based on a hand-coded sample was used to classify the
press releases into two groups: press releases describing UNOCI’s intergroup dia-
logue events and press releases on other topics.6 Intergroup dialogues are defined
according to three criteria: (1) these activities invite community leaders and
“ordinary” citizens from different ethnic groups in one or more villages or towns
within a department, (2) they are organized by civilian personnel from UNOCI, and
(3) civilian personnel facilitate dialogue between different ethnic populations, some-
times with the help of direct mediation, and promote norms for peaceful intergroup
relations. The final sample includes 586 department-months with at least one inter-
group dialogue activity and 777 intergroup dialogue activities in total between
354 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(2-3)
October 2011 and May 2016. For example, a report on intergroup dialogue activities
in May 2013 outlines the process as follows:
The United Nations Operations in Coˆte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the Commission for
Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation (CDVR) initiated on 28 May 2013 an intercom-
munity dialogue in Die´hiba . . .This initiative targets the re-establishment of confi-
dence between the communities in Die´hiba and the respect for the rule of law, as
per Annie Michelle Wabo from the section Civil Affairs and Mohamed Siedien from
the section Human Rights in the UNOCI office in Due´koue´. Francois Batahi, a member
of the CDVR, requests the management of misunderstandings by the chiefs and, if
necessary, the local administrative authorities. [ . . . ] The different traditional commu-
nity leaders embraced social cohesion and promised to continue working in this direc-
tion. Workshops were initiated on [conflict] resolution and recommendations were
made for consolidating reconciliation and cohesion between the Die´hiba communities
in the Duekoue´ department. (UNOCI News 2013)
Figures 1 and 2 plot the distribution of UNOCI’s intergroup dialogue activities
over time and geographically between October 2011 and May 2016.
To measure the outcome variables, I employ information from the African Con-
flict Locations and Events Dataset (ACLED) collected from news reports (Raleigh
et al. 2010). To maximize validity, ACLED only records the hard facts of violent
events (location, date, and actors) rather than difficult-to-measure casualty numbers
or the motivations of perpetrators. These media-based data, however, may not be
independent of UNOCI’s activities because journalists may become more attentive
to violence in specific locations due to press releases on UNOCI’s activities. Yet, a
positive correlation between UNOCI’s intergroup dialogues and violent events
reported in ACLED should make it more difficult to find evidence for the argument
and the proposed negative relationship between dialogues and violence.
Figure 1. Spatial variation in dialogue activities.
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The analyses use two binary dependent variables for communal violence. The
first dependent variable measures communal violence involving groups of civilians
(in ACLED: violence by rioters or communal militias). The second dependent vari-
able captures communal violence perpetrated by nonstate armed groups (in ACLED:
violence by political militias and rebel groups where the event description makes
reference to the communal identity of target or perpetrator).7 Communal violence by
groups of civilians and communal violence by nonstate armed groups account for 48
percent and 25 percent of all violent events in Coˆte d’Ivoire (2012 to 2016), respec-
tively. The secondary literature suggests that Coˆte d’Ivoire is not an outlier in terms
of the prevalence of communal violence. Similar communal violence triggered 31
percent of all ethnic civil war onsets between 1945 and 2008 (Fearon and Laitin
2011). Thus, intergroup dialogues address a significant threat to peace. The events
that are not classified as communal violence (27 percent) are perpetrated by either
government agents or criminal and foreign armed groups without communal identity
or ties.8 Analyzing the counts of these noncommunal events tests the argument that
the effect of intergroup dialogues is specific to communal violence (see Online
Appendix C). The temporal and spatial distribution of the main dependent variables
is shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
The analyses control for factors that may influence the relationship between
intergroup dialogue activities and communal violence. First, I control for peace-
keeping capacity in the form of subnational deployment of UN police and UN
military.9 UN security personnel may decrease incidents of violence and, conse-
quently, increase activities organized by UN civilian staff. I collected personnel data
myself using the methodology developed by Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis
(2017).10 Furthermore, election months likely influence intergroup dialogue activi-
ties by either increasing such activities to prevent election violence or diverting UN
resources to other election-related tasks. Elections may also increase communal
Figure 2. Temporal variation in dialogue activities.
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violence by heightening competition (Klaus and Mitchell 2015). I also add a mea-
sure for competitiveness—that is, the margin of victory in each department in the last
presidential election (Balcells 2017).11 Competitiveness likely influences violence
and, by extension, peacekeeping efforts. Geographical features should influence
peacekeepers’ ability to travel and organize activities on the one hand and, on the
other hand, state capacity and the risk of violent conflict (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and
Gizels 2017). First, I include travel time, which provides an estimate of the average
travel time (in minutes) to get from a department to the nearest major city of over
50,000 inhabitants by land (Uchida and Nelson 2009). Second, I add border dis-
tance, which is the distance from the center of each department (centroid) to the
border of the nearest neighboring country (in kilometers; Weidmann, Kuse, and
Figure 3. Spatial variation in violent events.
Figure 4. Temporal variation in violent events.
Smidt 357
Gleditsch 2010). The analysis controls for the mean infant mortality rate in the
department (using data from the year 2000) to approximate socioeconomic devel-
opment (Storeygard et al. 2008; Center for International Earth Science Information
Network [CIESIN], Columbia University 2005). Infant mortality rate, border dis-
tance, and average travel time come from the PRIO-GRID data frame (Tollefsen,
Strand, and Buhaug 2012). Finally, the population size of a department should
determine the likelihood of violence and, consequently, efforts by UN peace-
keepers.12 The latter four variables are standardized. Summary statistics are pro-
vided in Online Appendix A.
Statistical analyses based on observed data likely underestimate the violence-
reducing impact of intergroup dialogue activities because UN PKOs tend to con-
centrate their resources in violence-prone places (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson
2019; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). To approximate the causal effect of
local intergroup dialogues, I use two strategies. First, a recursive bivariate probit
model simultaneously estimates whether a department hosted an activity (equation
1), whether violence has occurred in a given month (equation 2), and the correlation
between the errors of these equations. The correlation of errors accounts for the
possibility that unobserved factors (e.g., PKO intelligence) determine both dialogue
activities and violence.
Estimating a bivariate probit model requires an instrument, an exogenous variable
explaining variation in the location and timing of intergroup dialogues. I use the
interaction term between the supply of international Human Rights and Civil Affairs
personnel to UNOCI (civilian personnel)13 and the standardized driving distance
from each department’s center to the nearest human rights field offices of UNOCI
(distance to field office).14 Increasing civilian personnel allows UNOCI to organize
more intergroup dialogue activities, while the UN PKO may find it more difficult to
organize activities at a greater distance from its field offices given transport costs or
missing knowledge about remote locations. Civilian personnel numbers only change
over time. The distances to field offices only vary across space. Yet, the interaction
(Personnel  Distance) is space- and time-varying and therefore a suitable instru-
ment for the location and timing of UNOCI’s intergroup dialogues.
The interaction between civilian personnel and the distances to field offices
fulfills the conditions for an instrument. First, it strongly correlates with intergroup
dialogue activities. The analyses show that additional staff members have a signif-
icantly larger effect on the occurrence of intergroup dialogues at a greater distance
from field offices (see Online Appendix B). Second, the organizational logic of
UNOCI (rather than the dependent variable—communal violence—or omitted cor-
relates) likely explains the interaction effect or why increasing personnel resources
makes UNOCI organize intergroup dialogues in more distant places whereas
increasing personnel resources does not affect UNOCI’s activities near field offices.
Finally, the interaction only affects the dependent variable through UNOCI’s inter-
group dialogue activities. This is plausible because the interaction term—the greater
effect of changes in civilian personnel in more remote places further away from field
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offices—is very specific to UNOCI’s organizational logic (see Ruggeri, Dorussen,
and Gizelis 2017, 177, for a similar interaction term as instrument).
Second, I account for pretreatment observable confounding factors using the
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) method developed by Iacus, King, and Porro
(2011). CEM creates a quasi-experimental sample in which potentially confound-
ing factors—variables that bias the effect of intergroup dialogue activities because
they influence both these activities and communal violence—are equally distrib-
uted across “treated departments” with prior intergroup dialogue activities and
“control” departments without this engagement. CEM discards observations that
are too different from treated observations. For the remaining cases, CEM pro-
duces weights that adjust remaining imbalances in the distributions of potential
confounders.
Table 1 shows the prematching and postmatching imbalance measures L1 and
the difference in means for each matching variable between the group of treated
observations with intergroup dialogue activities and the group of control obser-
vations without such activities. The imbalance measure L1 for a specific vari-
able can be understood as the nonoverlapping area of two histograms, one for
the distribution of treated observations and another for the distribution of control
observations of this variable. The univariate imbalance improved for all match-
ing variables. Moreover, the overall multivariate imbalance L1 substantively
decreased from 0.57 to 0.15 after matching. Thus, department-months where
UNOCI conducted local intergroup dialogue activities now look much like those
without such activities.
Finally, Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) show that binary cross-sectional time
series data are identical to grouped duration data and likely violate the independence
assumption. To account for the fact that the length of a period without violence
influences the probability of subsequent violent conflict, all models include the
number of months that have passed between violent events (peace spell) as well
as the squared term (peace spell^2) and cubic term (peace spell^3) of this variable
(Carter and Signorino 2010).
Table 1. Imbalance Statistics before and after Matching.
Matching Variables
Prematching Postmatching
L1 Mean Difference L1 Mean Difference
UN police .092 .370 .009 .001
UN military .330 .396 .031 .010
Competitiveness .168 .044 .026 .000
Border distance .231 .189 .034 .006
Travel time .214 .242 .073 .004
Infant mortality .183 .318 .015 .002
Population .308 .046 .066 .003
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Findings
The statistical analyses of communal violence by groups of civilians (Table 2) and
armed groups with local ties (Table 3) in Coˆte d’Ivoire support the argument. Local
intergroup dialogue interventions significantly reduce the probability of communal
violence (Hypothesis 1), while anecdotal evidence shows the plausibility of the
proposed mechanisms explaining this effect: solving information and coordination
problems and reducing biases and negative feelings.
Before turning to the effect of UNOCI’s intergroup dialogues, I examine the
effects of the control variables in the prematching analyses (models 1 and 4).15
Departments that are more rural (travel time), closer to international borders (border
distance), economically less marginalized (infant mortality rate), and more popu-
lous (population size) have a greater chance of seeing intergroup dialogues. While
travel time, border distance, and infant mortality rate have no effect on violence by
groups of civilians, population size has a positive and significant coefficient
(model 1). Population size also tends to increase communal violence by armed
groups with local ties. In addition, departments closer to international borders exhi-
bit a significantly higher risk of communal violence by armed groups (model 4).
Overall, the significant effects suggest that UNOCI convenes more intergroup dia-
logues in places and times more prone to communal violence.
The other control variables have mixed effects. UN police and UN military have
positive coefficients in the equation for intergroup dialogue activities, though only
police deployment is a significant predictor of UNOCI’s activity. Yet, UN police and
UN military are not associated with communal violence. It is important to note,
though, that police and military are likely deployed in more violence-prone areas.
Therefore, the effects should not lead to the conclusion that the UN police and
military are ineffective in reducing communal violence (see Online Appendix G).
The variable for election months does not affect intergroup dialogues, but it
increases the risk of violence involving civilians. Competitiveness has a positive but
nonsignificant effect on intergroup dialogue interventions. While competitiveness
does not influence violence involving civilians, its coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant in the equation for communal violence by armed groups. Overall, the effects
of the controls match prior expectations.
Thus, I now turn to the main effect of interest—that is, how UNOCI’s intergroup
dialogue activities influence communal violence. In the prematching analyses
(model 1) for communal violence by groups of civilians (Table 2), the coefficient
for UNOCI’s intergroup dialogue activities fails to reach conventional levels of
significance. In the postmatching analyses, however, the coefficient for UNOCI’s
intergroup dialogue activities is negative and significant. On average, one or more
dialogue events within the previous three months subsequently decrease the prob-
ability of violence by groups of civilians by 25.4 percentage points (model 2) and,
when controlling for regional heterogeneity, by 21.6 percentage points (model 3).
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UN police 0.0803** 0.0575 0.00942 0.182* 0.0149 0.185*
(0.0282) (0.0615) (0.0428) (0.0910) (0.0429) (0.0841)
UN military 0.0154 0.0897 0.0155 0.172* 0.0137 0.177*
(0.0362) (0.0660) (0.0454) (0.0721) (0.0456) (0.0843)
Election months 0.0111 0.250* 0.0209 0.0379 0.0200 0.0314
(0.0423) (0.113) (0.0577) (0.104) (0.0578) (0.111)
Competitiveness 0.0638 0.0220 0.00240 0.0331 0.00680 0.0909
(0.0749) (0.195) (0.111) (0.147) (0.112) (0.178)
Travel time 0.142** 0.100 0.00380 0.00879 0.00940 0.0445
(0.0237) (0.0714) (0.0295) (0.0411) (0.0298) (0.0445)
Border distance 0.169** 0.0339 0.00952 0.0438 0.0174 0.180y
(0.0241) (0.0597) (0.0349) (0.0447) (0.0351) (0.0978)
Infant mortality 0.0529* 0.00826 0.00345 0.0219 0.0100 0.0405
(0.0219) (0.0468) (0.0299) (0.0384) (0.0300) (0.0471)
Population size 5.589** 1.660 0.458 0.266 0.335 0.632
(0.356) (1.064) (0.503) (0.638) (0.506) (0.881)
Peace spell (civilian) 0.0296 0.0129 0.0113
(0.0204) (0.0117) (0.0123)
Peace spell (civilian)^2 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Peace spell (civilian)^3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Civilian personnel 0.0083 0.0091 0.0106
(0.014) (0.0139) (0.0144)
Distance to field office 1.552** 1.084* 1.255*
(0.440) (0.439) (0.488)
Personnel  Distance 0.0515** 0.0424* 0.0475*
(0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0187)
Constant 0.507 1.823** 0.867* 0.552** 0.917* 0.800**
(0.380) (0.301) (0.385) (0.201) (0.399) (0.187)
Observations 5,671 4,351 4,351
Log likelihood 2,844.9 2,848.4 2,828.4
BIC 5,914.6 5,914.6 5,966.8
AIC 5,741.9 5,748.8 5,730.8
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. UN ¼ United Nations; UNOCI ¼ United Nations



















UN police 0.0807** 0.1005 0.0188 0.1591y 0.0178 0.2422**
(0.0282) (0.1065) (0.0434) (0.0826) (0.0436) (0.0790)
UN military 0.0153 0.2185* 0.0123 0.1686 0.0105 0.2813**
(0.0361) (0.0889) (0.0456) (0.1031) (0.0458) (0.1038)
Election months 0.0113 0.0746 0.0186 0.1324 0.0211 0.1276
(0.0423) (0.1388) (0.0606) (0.0837) (0.0604) (0.0950)
Competitiveness 0.0638 0.4376y 0.0131 0.0386 0.0193 0.5920
(0.0749) (0.2457) (0.1128) (0.1671) (0.1136) (0.4284)
Travel time 0.1415** 0.0466 0.0160 0.0228 0.0127 0.1657y
(0.0237) (0.0662) (0.0303) (0.0581) (0.0299) (0.0856)
Border distance 0.1692** 0.1377y 0.0171 0.0052 0.0168 0.0503
(0.0241) (0.0722) (0.0358) (0.0500) (0.0361) (0.0817)
Infant mortality 0.0535* 0.0777 0.0200 0.0192 0.0188 0.0424
(0.0219) (0.0494) (0.0314) (0.0334) (0.0316) (0.0482)
Population size 5.5938** 2.1199y 0.1107 0.6077 0.1154 0.0323























Constant 0.4942 1.5687** 1.0779* 0.9417* 1.0687* 3.3511**
(0.3795) (0.3426) (0.4670) (0.3861) (0.4848) (0.2819)
Observations 5,671 4,351 4,351
Log likelihood 2,725.6 2,663.1 2,634.4
BIC 5,675.8 5,544.1 5,578.7
AIC 5,503.1 5,378.3 5,342.8
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. UN ¼ United Nations; UNOCI ¼ United Nations
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The findings are very similar for communal violence by armed groups, presented
in Table 3. In the prematching analysis (model 4), UNOCI’s dialogue activities have
a significantly negative coefficient, yet the marginal effect is not significant. In the
postmatching analyses, however, UNOCI’s dialogue activities are associated with a
significant reduction in the risk of communal violence by armed groups. All else
equal, intergroup dialogues reduce the risk of communal violence by armed groups
by 26.9 percentage points (model 5) and, when the analyses control for regional
heterogeneity, by 17.8 percentage points (model 6).
With these statistical analyses, it is not possible to empirically distinguish
between the two mechanisms—(1) strengthening information sharing and coordina-
tion and (2) reducing biases and negative feelings—or to test plausible alternative or
complementary pathways through which UNOCI’s dialogue activities may influ-
ence communal violence. But qualitative evidence from UN press releases supports
the plausibility of both mechanisms. As an illustrative case, I examine the intergroup
dialogue event on September 23, 2015, in Bayota and a follow-up event in Gagnoa.
The two towns are located in the center-west of Coˆte d’Ivoire (United Nations
Security Council 2015, 3).
In line with the proposition that intergroup dialogues facilitate information
exchange and coordination, this meeting led to an agreement among chiefs to set
up a mechanism for resolving future disputes. After the intergroup dialogue meeting,
the chief of the canton Ne´ke´dji (traditional administrative unit) that comprises the
town of Bayota, Boti Koudou affirmed that “[a]s a representative of this population,
I’m making a firm commitment that we are going to live in harmony here in Bayota
[ . . . ]. We have suggested to the deputy prefect that we set up a tripartite commission
comprising members of the indigenous and immigrant communities, as well as local
government, that will be in charge of raising the alarm with the deputy prefect at the
first sign of any trouble. This would mean that from chief to chief, official to official
we can put out the fire” (UNOCI News 2015a). In line with the theoretical expecta-
tion, this intergroup dialogue activity in Bayota led to improved coordination among
community leaders (and prefects) and their commitment to solve communal disputes
peacefully.
There is also evidence supporting the second mechanism. The intergroup dialo-
gue in Bayota, which included 350 community leaders and ordinary citizens from
different sections of society, led to a reaffirmation of peaceful norms for intergroup
relations. Intergroup dialogue reduced participants’ negative feelings toward other
ethnic groups and increased their perception of greater benefits from communal
peace. A women’s leader said that “[a]fter discussions with our sisters and after
we had made our apologies, we made a commitment that we would do our best to
ensure that in Bayota, we would live in perfect harmony from now on and work for
the development of our town” (UNOCI News 2015a). In a follow-up meeting on
October 8, 2015, in Gagnoa, the next largest town near Bayota and the seat of
Gagnoa Department, community leaders committed to spreading peaceful norms
in their locality. Chief Koudou Denis said “they were already on a peace mission in
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their department and will be working on this every day” (UNOCI News 2015b).16
This anecdotal evidence buttresses the plausibility of the second mechanism: that
intergroup dialogues reduce biases and negative feelings toward other groups and
encourage behaviors that support peaceful intergroup relations—for example, apolo-
gies, public commitments to peaceful behavior, and advocacy for local
peacebuilding.
Testing Alternative Explanations
In this section, I seek to eliminate rival explanations. The first is that the effect of
dialogue activities originates from the presence of UN personnel rather than their
intergroup dialogue activities. Yet, Online Appendix D shows that the inclusion of
the sum of military and police personnel (UN personnel) does not change the effect
of UNOCI’s intergroup dialogue activities. UN personnel is also not associated with
communal violence by groups of civilians and has a positive coefficient in the model
for communal violence by armed groups. This suggests that the type of activity
rather than UN PKOs’ presence matters (see also Online Appendix G).
A second rival explanation is that UN peacekeepers’ intergroup dialogue activ-
ities do not reduce violence but rather displace violence to neighboring departments.
Online Appendix E provides evidence to reject this possibility. Interventions in
neighboring departments do not increase violence. If anything, the nonsignificant
negative effect of the spatial lag of intergroup dialogue activities and its interaction
with the number of neighboring departments indicate potential peace-inducing spil-
lover effects benefiting intergroup peace nearby.
The third alternative explanation for the negative correlation between intergroup
dialogues and communal violence is the argument that UN intergroup dialogues
temporally delay communal violence. Violent perpetrators may just stay inactive
for a few months after an intervention to avoid drawing further international atten-
tion to the community. The evidence presented in Online Appendix F leads me to
reject this argument. None of the temporal lags of intergroup dialogue interventions
four to twelve months previously significantly increase communal violence. On the
contrary, the results indicate that previously organized intergroup dialogue activities
have an added violence-reducing effect for up to nine months.
Conclusion
In 2013, more than half of the residents (52 percent) in the violence-prone region
Western Comoe´ reported improved intercommunal relations (Pritchard 2016, 271).
Civilian peacekeepers may have contributed to this result. This study provides robust
evidence that UNOCI’s efforts to strengthen local conflict resolution capacity
through intergroup dialogue activities decreased the average risk of communal
violence. Its findings should encourage international and national organizations that
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local intergroup dialogue can meaningfully complement national-level peacebuild-
ing initiatives.
The article provides a novel argument for how outside interventions can contrib-
ute to peace in postwar environments. Existing studies argue that peacekeeping
works to reduce violence by monitoring belligerents’ behavior, imposing costs for
coercive acts, replacing dysfunctional state structures, and de-escalating local con-
flicts through facilitating communication between political and armed group leaders.
Adding to this latter mechanism, this study examines peacekeepers’ intergroup
dialogue activities and, thus, shifts the focus from political and armed groups to
community leaders and local populations as well as from reactive responses to
peacekeepers’ more preventive engagement in order to strengthen the locally rooted
mechanisms and norms for peaceful dispute settlement. Furthermore, while conflict
research tends to prioritize civil war–related violence by governments and nonstate
armed actors, local-level “everyday” or “peacetime” violence after war can also
undermine peacebuilding processes (Autesserre 2009). Examining possible solu-
tions is therefore important and the focus of this article. Empirically, the article
analyzes a novel data set containing spatially and temporally disaggregated infor-
mation on UN peacekeepers’ intergroup dialogue activities. While recent research
has significantly advanced our knowledge about coercive peacekeeping mechanisms
at the local level (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017), this study is the first to
systematically evaluate how civilian peacekeeping activities on the ground influence
collective violence.
The study can be extended in several ways. First, my findings are limited to Coˆte
d’Ivoire. It is beyond the scope of the article to test the validity of the argument in
different war-torn countries. However, case evidence from Somalia (Menkhaus
1996), Ethiopia (Hagmann 2007) and Liberia (Hartman, Blair, and Blattman
2018) suggests that UN peacekeepers’ efforts to strengthen local conflict resolution
mechanisms may also work in other war-torn countries. Second, it is difficult to test
the persistence of the effects of intergroup dialogue activities because intergroup
dialogues occur frequently over time and there is no sustained period without inter-
vention following an intergroup dialogue event. Yet, additional analyses suggest that
intergroup dialogues held up to nine months previously still reduce communal
violence if we hold constant the more or less frequent interventions in the meantime.
Third, despite some anecdotal evidence, the article has to remain agnostic about the
microlevel mechanisms through which intergroup dialogue interventions work.
Interviews with peacekeepers and community leaders, surveys of participants in
UN activities, and similar individual-level data would help to empirically untangle
the causal story. Despite these limits, the study constitutes a crucial step forward in
understanding peacekeeping mechanisms. In their recent article exploring the effect
of subnational deployment of UN peacekeepers, Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis
(2017, 182) recognize that we “lack information about the precise actions and
policies implemented locally by UN peacekeepers” and conclude that “[a]rguably,
these policies are crucial for winning the peace locally.” This article provides some
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of the missing evidence on peacekeepers’ actions and policies, confirms the authors’
intuition, and shows that it is also through strengthening conflict resolution locally
that peacekeeping contributes to a reduction in violence.
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Notes
1. The data set, do-files, and R scripts for the empirical analysis in this article can be found
at https://journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr. The analyses are conducted with Stata version
13. The data preparation was done in R version 3.4.3 (2017-11-30).
2. Communal violence refers to violence between two or more groups. Groups are often
defined in terms of ascriptive identities (ethnicity, religion) as well as by their location
within an area (e.g., belonging to a specific village and neighborhood group). Communal,
intercommunal, and intergroup violences are used as synonyms.
3. Disputes over land relate to much more than just property rights. The disputes involve
intergenerational conflicts (youth blaming parents for giving property away to migrants),
formalized individual versus customary collective rights, and the definition of Ivorian
identity and citizenship rights (Pritchard 2016). These disputes are supercharged with
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experiences of terrible losses and threats of more large-scale violence (International
Crisis Group 2014).
4. The sample excludes the autonomous district of Abidjan because the dynamics of vio-
lence in the economic capital are different than in other parts of Coˆte d’Ivoire (e.g., Straus
2011). Abidjan is home to more than four million people (roughly a quarter of all Ivorian
residents). In contrast to the case in smaller cities and villages, residents of Abidjan live in
less secluded and less tightly knit communities.
5. My interviews with UNOCI personnel confirm that press releases provide an accurate
picture of UNOCI’s local peacebuilding activities.
6. Before applying the classification algorithm, I created a document-term matrix, removed
stopwords that did not carry meaning (“the,” “a”), and specified important bigrams and
trigrams, such as “social cohesion,” “human rights,” and “conflict resolution.” From the
press releases reporting local intergroup dialogue activities, I have automatically
extracted and manually checked the dates and the locations of such activities.
7. Communal violence by armed groups includes, for example, “an attack carried out on
Thursday night in the Kokoma district of Due´koue´, inhabited mostly by ethnic Malinke´,
claimed four lives.” As a robustness test, I construct a more lenient version of the second
dependent variable which includes all violent events by armed groups (in ACLED: rebel
groups and political militias) even if the event description does not refer to the communal
identity of perpetrator or target. Yet, this event count excludes events by criminal groups
(seventeen events) and by foreign groups with a nationalist, religious, or ideological
agenda (two events by al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb). The results presented in Online
Appendix H are similar to those in the main analysis.
8. As expected, Online Appendix C shows that intergroup dialogue activities do not influ-
ence noncommunal violence by government security forces or nonstate armed groups.
9. The police personnel estimate only includes formal police units.
10. First, I compiled all reports from the secretary-general on the UN peacekeeping mission
in Coˆte d’Ivoire. Deployment maps in these reports provide information on the location of
bases, the nature of the contingent deployed, and the nationality of the peacekeepers
deployed at the bases. I triangulated the information from the maps with UN data on
how many peacekeepers from specific nations were deployed to the UN peacekeeping
mission in Coˆte d’Ivoire. Accordingly, I estimated how many peacekeepers were
deployed in a particular town (base) over time and then totaled the deployment numbers
by department.
11. For January 2012 through December 2013, I calculate the departmental margin of victory
in the 2010 presidential elections. For January 2014 to May 2016, I use the votes for
Ouattara divided by the number of abstentions. The election results come from the
Election Commission.
12. Data are obtained from the Institut National de la Statistique (2014).
13. Yearly data on the number of international civilian personnel were collected from the
reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The
collection of reports can be found here: http://www.un.org/ga/acabq/documents/all/
596?order¼title&sort¼asc, accessed on January 29, 2018.
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14. The distance was measured using the R package OSRM Version 3.1.1 and data from
OpenStreetMap.
15. After matching, the estimated coefficients are no longer interpretable as sample average
effects due to pruning of observations and matching weights to balance sample covariate
values.
16. Women leaders and customary authorities at the second meeting told the author that
intergroup dialogues calmed their spirits and fostered norms for peaceful intergroup
relations.
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